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Abstract: In this paper we present an architecture based on a Java (J2SE, J2EE, J2ME 
and Java Card) platform supporting a secure channel from a Mobile Operator 
to the SIM card. This channel offers the possibility of end to end security for 
delivery of large data files to a GSM SIM card. Such a secure channel could be 
used for delivery of high value content that requires a high bandwidth channel 
– perhaps either rendered for user infotainment, or processed in the client 
Mobile Station (device and SIM card) for remote device management. Our 
methodology overcomes the bandwidth constraints of the SIM Toolkit 
Security scheme described in GSM standard 03.48. To validate our proposal 
we have developed code to create DRM and Web Service test scenarios 
utilising readily available J2ME, Java Card, J2SE and J2EE platforms, Web 
Services tools from Apache, the KToolBar emulator from Sun, and a Gemplus 
Java Card. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in September 1994, the SIM Application Toolkit 
(SAT) (3GPP TS 31.111, 2004; GSM 11.14, 2001) and SIM Toolkit Security 
(3GPP TS 03.48, 2001) have been used extensively. They are primarily used 
to securely transfer device and network management information and simple 
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user applications (such as device independent, Operator-specific, power-on 
menus) to the SIM card. 
These two independent concepts – the SAT and GSM standard 03.48, 
have been a very successful marriage (Guthery and Cronin, 2002). SAT 
allows applications resident within the tamper proof SIM card to initiate 
actions, whilst GSM standard 03.48 provides security services for any SMS 
message. Together they have been a critical enabler of many network 
management and revenue generating services deployed by GSM operators 
worldwide. 
However the availability of large capacity SIM cards and high 
performance 2.5G and 3G devices means that this once-successful 
combination is now proving to be a constraint for the following reasons: 
• GSM standard 03.48 uses SMS as the transport mechanism. SMS stands 
for Short Message Service, and is a way of sending a maximum of 160 
characters (140 bytes) to and from mobile devices. Despite the GSM 
standard 03.48 allowing the concatenation of up to 255 such SMS 
messages to increase the payload, it is reported (Guthery and Cronin, 
2002) that most operators limit this to approximately 5, i.e. a maximum 
payload of only 700 bytes. This is due to uncertain and indeterminate 
device operation when receiving such a large concatenated SMS 
message. With 128kB Java Card devices now routinely deployed, this 
bandwidth limitation is equivalent to less than 1% of the capacity of 
current generation SIM cards. 
• Although a significant innovation in 1994, the SAT instruction list 
comprises only 31 proactive commands. These commands provide only 
limited control over the user experience, e.g. PLAY TONE, DISPLAY 
TEXT, GET INKEY, more appropriate for the text-based devices of the 
mid 1990’s. The devices typical of today’s 2.5G and 3G market would 
benefit from greater application customisation capability between device 
and SIM card. 
A secure channel capable of downloading high bandwidth, high-value 
data within an application framework that provides rich control over the host 
device could thus be advantageous. This paper proposes such a channel. 
2. THE JAVA FRAMEWORK 
In recent years, Java enabled devices have become increasingly popular 
within the mobile market. Our proposal creates a high bandwidth secure 
channel for a Java platform, utilising Java Card (Chen, 2004) and J2ME 
(Topley, 2002) technologies. 
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In the GSM and UMTS system architectures, the Mobile Station (MS) 
may comprise two java components: 
• the user device (often referred to as the handset). This typically 
comprises a Java runtime environment conforming to the J2ME 
Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC), complemented by 
additional classes from the Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP). 
Java applications that run on MIDP compliant user devices are known as 
MIDlets. 
• the SIM card provided by the network operator. The latest generation 
devices are typically UICC (3GPP TS 31.101, 2003) Java Cards where 
the SIM application (3GPP TS 31.102, 2003) is just one of the possible 
Java applications (ETSI TS 101 476, 2000) that the Java Card is capable 
of running. Java applications that run on Java Cards are known as 
Applets. 
Recent work through the Java Community Process (JCP) has increased 
the utility of a mobile Java solution. The result of this technical innovation 
has been a rapid growth of complex, revenue generating, but largely fun-
based J2ME applications within the gaming and entertainment sector. 
However, although some serious business applications exist (Itani and 
Kayssi, 2004), the Java environment has largely been ignored by the 
professional business and network management community because of 
concerns over security.  
The fundamental problem is that the MIDlet runs within the Java 
implementation of the user device. The user device is unlikely to be trusted 
by the Operator to hold network level components and functions that protect 
valuable network assets. This distrust is likely to get worse as devices move 
from traditionally closed proprietary operating systems to more open 
operating systems capable of performing the file manipulation required by 
advanced 2.5G and 3G services. Securing a J2ME application currently 
requires the security keys, certificates and user identities to be stored within 
the user device. Many institutions within the Mobile Operator and Financial 
Service sectors are likely to consider this to be an unacceptable security risk. 
In the GSM/3GPP mobile architecture, security and trust resides in two 
locations, the network HLR and the Operator issued tamper-resistant SIM 
card. The threat model is well researched and has resulted in the security 
services model at the heart of the GSM and 3GPP design (Hillebrand, 2002). 
What is needed is a methodology to extend this trust to the MIDlet 
environment. 
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3. THE SAT SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
Our proposal builds on the dual capabilities of SMS Security and SIM 
Application Toolkit (SAT). The former is defined in Security Mechanisms 
for SIM stage 2 (3GPP TS 03.48, 2001). It provides end to end security 
services for an SMS message going to or coming from the SIM card. The 
SAT API allows a SIM card application to be informed of events (referred to 
as event download) by the user device, and to issue commands (referred to as 
proactive command) to the user device. 
We use the proactive command SET_UP_EVENT_LIST to register for the 
SMS_PP event. On occurrence of such an event, or when commanded by the 
Protocol Identifier of the SMS Mandatory Header, the received SMS is 
passed on to the SIM application as a compound TLV (Tag Length Value) in 
the data field of an ENVELOPE APDU command. The SMS’s Command 
Header specifies how the payload data is secured. The SIM application’s 
response to the ENVELOPE command is then returned to the sender in a 
Response Packet. By using this approach, and by concatenating five SMS 
messages, it is possible to securely deliver around 700 bytes of data from 
Server to SIM card, receiving a proof of delivery in acknowledgement. We 
use this capability to securely transfer the Operator domain certificate and 
long term symmetric keys necessary to establish and secure our high 
bandwidth channel to the SIM card. 
4. THE PROPOSED SECURE DATA TRANSFER 
TECHNIQUE 
The MIDP 2.0 specification (JSR-118 JCP, 2002) introduces the concept 
of domains within a J2ME implementation (Block and Wagner, 2003). A 
Domain Protection Root Certificate controls application access to a domain. 
Any application within a domain enjoys a set of unique permissions and 
access to restricted and sensitive APIs provided by that domain. Before an 
application can be over the air (OTA) loaded into the Operator domain it 
must be digitally signed. The signature is checked against the SIM card 
resident root certificate and, if authorised, the application is loaded into the 
Operator domain of the untrusted device. 
The Security and Trust Services API (JSR-177 JCP, 2004) provides an 
Operator domain J2ME application with the ability to access a connected 
trusted element (i.e. a SIM card within our scenario). Our proposal involves 
creating a J2ME and Java Card Security Agent application that is capable of 
implementing a secure high bandwidth channel between Server and SIM 
card endpoints. At no time does the J2ME application have access to any of 
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the enabling cryptographic keys or functions. The bandwidth of the secure 
channel created by the Security Agent is only limited by the 2G/2.5G/3G 
network and the data rate resulting from the ENVELOPE APDU command. 
The J2ME element of the Security Agent benefits from the processing 
power and I/O capabilities of the user device and has direct access to the 
results of secure SIM card computations executed by the Java Card Applet. 
Serious business applications such as DRM, e-commerce and securing web 
services can now be implemented by combining such J2ME and Java Card 
Security Agent applications. These business applications will additionally 
benefit from device vendor independence and potentially rapid rollout from 
OTA distribution and installation. 
5. PROTOCOL 
Full details of our protocol are provided elsewhere (MacDonald et al., 
2004). It uses both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques to 
provide the authentication, integrity and confidentiality services required to 
support a secure high data bandwidth channel from Server to SIM card. Our 
protocol has been designed on the assumption that the user device and SIM 
card are pre-issued and in the field. We assume that neither user device nor 
SIM card contain pre-installed application code to create the desired secure 
high bandwidth channel. 
We choose to use symmetric rather than asymmetric cryptography for 
authentication and key agreement. Performance is critical in a mobile system 
and overhead must always be minimized wherever possible (Blanchard and 
Trask, 2002). The long term secret key KSC shared by the Server and the SIM 
card, and used to support the secure channel to the SIM, is confidentially 
distributed from the Server to the SIM card endpoint with authentication and 
integrity services provided by GSM standard 03.48. 
STEP 1 Install MIDlet into Operator Domain, and Applet into SIM 
The first step is to prepare the SIM card so that the MIDlet can be 
installed within the Operator domain of the J2ME device. The MExE (3GPP 
TS 23.057, 2003) security framework, like other specialist services and 
applications that use the mobile network purely as a transport mechanism, 
relies on signature verification before the MIDlet can be installed within the 
target domain. We use GSM standard 03.48 to securely transfer the Operator 
Domain public key certificate CertOP_DOM to the SIM card. The MExE J2ME 
implementation on the user device receives the signed MIDlet. Successful 
verification of the signature using the public key in CertOP_DOM provides data 
origin authentication and integrity of the MIDlet JAD and JAR files. The 
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Security Agent MIDlet is installed in the Operator domain of the user device 
with full JSR 177 permissions, allowing APDU commands to be issued to 
SIM card resident Applets. To initiate installation of the Java Card Security 
Agent Applet, the MIDlet starts an http session with the server, and supplies 
it with the SIM card’s unique identifier. The server responds with the SIM 
card Applet code, integrity protected with a MAC computed using the shared 
secret KSC. The MIDlet Security Agent then transfers this data to the SIM 
card via the Envelope APDU command. An on-card installer application 
verifies the MAC and hence the origin authentication and data integrity of 
the Applet. If there is any discrepancy the installation process ceases; 
otherwise the Security Agent Applet is securely installed. This results in the 
creation of an applet instance and its registration with the Java Card runtime 
environment. 
Note that neither MIDlet nor Applet carry any secret keys or other private 
data. Hence code encryption is not necessary. Integrity services to protect the 
MIDlet and Applet against virus insertion attack whilst in transit are required 
and are provided by the use of Digital Signatures and MACs respectively. 
STEP 2 Perform mutual entity authentication 
At some time later, i.e. after the http session of STEP 1 has closed and 
both Applet and MIDlet are installed, the Operator may choose to securely 
download bulk data from the Server to the SIM card. Before this begins, 
both endpoints verify each other’s identity by means of a mutual entity 
authentication protocol. We use a three-pass mutual authentication protocol 
based on MACs and nonces, as specified in ISO/IEC 9798-4 (ISO/IEC9798-
4, 1999). 
STEP 3 Set up session keys to protect bulk data transfer 
Following mutual entity authentication, both Server and SIM card derive 
session Integrity (IK) and Confidentiality (CK) keys to provide security 
services to protect the bulk data transferred between Server and SIM card. 
Both Server and SIM card Applet will contain identical functions f1 and f2 to 
calculate the session cipher and integrity keys using the nonces rS and rC 
exchanged as part of the authentication protocol in step 2, and the long term 
shared secret KSC, as follows: 
CK = f1KSC(rS||rC)  and  IK = f2KSC(rS||rC). 
Once session keys have been established, the bulk data may be 
transferred between Server and SIM, encrypted for confidentiality with CK 
and concatenated with a MAC computed using IK for data origin 
authentication and integrity. 
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6. PROOF OF CONCEPT PROTOTYPE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
To validate our proposal we have constructed the Proof of Concept 
model of Figure 1, based on readily available open source tools: 
[ 
Figure 1. Proof of Concept Prototype Implementation 
• A J2EE Servlet web application performs the Mobile Operator function 
and is packaged as a WAR file (Web Application Archive) for easy 
deployment on a Tomcat Apache Web Server. 
• The J2ME Client is emulated by the Wireless KToolbar (Sun 
Microsystems, 2003) from Sun Microsystems, running our Security 
Agent MIDP 2.0 MIDlet on the reference J2ME implementation.  
• The SIM card function is provided by a Gemplus GemXpresso RAD 211 
Java Card with crypto package, connected to our demonstration 
environment via a USB card reader. 
• A Web Service application communicates with the Mobile Operator 
function using SOAP over http. We used the jax-rpc API together with 
tools from Apache Axis to create the service WSDL and deploy the Web 
Service on a Tomcat Server.  
The demonstration environment of our proof of concept model is 
implemented in J2SE. J2SE provides the necessary Java Swing classes for 
monitoring the various use case applications tested on our model. The model 
is designed so that each phase of a specific use case is initiated manually and 
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monitored by visual feedback through the use of J2SE's GUI 
LayoutManager class and ActionListener interface. 
A framework that provides a high bandwidth secure channel between 
Server and SIM card is a significant enabler for application deployment. For 
demonstration purposes we have deployed Digital Rights Management and 
Web Services Security platform applications onto this framework. We now 
review how these operations leverage the proposed high bandwidth channel 
and framework; full details are provided in MacDonald and Mitchell (2004a) 
and MacDonald and Mitchell (2004b). 
6.1 Proof of Concept DRM Applications 
Digital Rights Management is an attempt to use technology to limit 
piracy and copyright violation of digital media (Litman, 2001). DRM 
solutions typically separate the Digital Asset from the Rights Object. Often 
the Asset is encrypted with a secret key. A separately delivered Rights 
Object includes both the secret key for decryption of the Asset and the user 
permissions. The user must therefore have both the Digital Asset and the 
Rights Object to render the digital asset. Without the Rights Object, the 
Digital Asset may be peer to peer distributed, and transferred from device to 
device. 
Our framework is ideally suited to such a content centric DRM 
application. Typically the user device would be notified of the receipt of 
such an encrypted Digital Asset by the asset’s MIME type. This would 
invoke the Security Agent to store the encrypted Digital Asset in the, 
relatively plentiful, device memory, and then securely fetch the Rights 
Object from the Rights Fulfilment Server. The Rights Object would be 
securely transferred to the SIM card via our high bandwidth channel. The 
Digital Asset is recoverable only by the entity that holds the Rights Object. 
At some time later, upon user request, the Digital Asset would be 
transferred (perhaps streamed) to the SIM card for authorisation, where it is 
decrypted and streamed back to the device for consumption and rendering. 
The Rights Object, comprising the root decryption key of the Digital Asset 
and the current user permissions, would always reside on the secure SIM 
card. Such an implementation greatly reduces the network resource cost 
incurred by the practice of streaming each rendering instance of the Digital 
Asset over the WAN 2.5G and 3G network. 
6.2 Proof of Concept Web Services Security Application 
Our framework can be extended to provide a mobile Operator endorsed 
authentication and payment platform for web services. For this vertical 
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application the Server Servlet also provides the stub to the remote Web 
Service which is packaged as a WAR file and deployed on the Tomcat 
Server. Described by its WSDL we use the JAX-RPC API from Apache 
Axis to create the stubs to the service interface. Communication between 
Servlet and Web Service is according to the SOAP protocol using http as the 
transport mechanism. 
In this application a high level user discovery process is provided by the 
J2ME Security Agent. User service selection initiates the mutual 
authentication step concluding with the creation of the high bandwidth 
secure channel between Server and SIM card. The Server may now issue an 
authentication token followed by an authenticated payment token when the 
user decides to consume the service. The authenticated payment token is 
exchanged for the web service, and the content associated with the service 
provided to the Server using SOAP over http. The service content may now 
be securely transferred to the SIM card via the high bandwidth J2ME and 
JavaCard Security Agent channel. This implementation provides: 
• the user with a high level service discovery interface plus anonymity 
from Web Service providers; 
• the Mobile Operator with a pivotal role and revenue generating 
opportunity in the provision of a web services security and payment 
platform; 
• the Content Provider with a secure, scaleable distribution channel. 
Note that, whilst it is possible to use the J2ME and Java Card Security 
Agent to create a secure high bandwidth channel, it may not be desirable to 
use these entities for service rendering and consumption. Extending 
connectivity to the personal area network of the J2ME device is particularly 
straightforward given the availability of the SAT OPEN CHANNEL proactive 
command. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have introduced a novel approach to securely transfer 
large data files from an application server to the mobile device SIM card. 
Our approach is based on a Java solution and overcomes a potential 
bandwidth restriction of the current GSM standard 03.48 and SAT Security 
process. We present a protocol and methodology that allows the secure 
channel to be created on capable, but unprepared, devices and SIM cards that 
are already issued. We have modelled our proposed solution and protocol 
using open source tools and indicate how it can be extended to apply to 
future application implementations such as DRM and Web Services. 
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